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Hitotsubashi University and RIETI
As manufacturing sectors of developed economies outsource more 
and more to developing economies, this may give rise to a serious mea-
surement problem. If a manufacturing industry (or fi rm) procures a lot 
of parts and components from developing economies at exceptionally 
low prices and we do not correctly take account of these low prices, we 
will overestimate the productivity of this industry (or fi rm). 
In this chapter, we investigate two types of biases to manufacturing 
statistics from the growth in manufacturers’ use of imported intermedi-
ates—commonly known as offshoring. 
The fi rst type of bias concerns measuring the use of imported prod-
ucts in the economy. Most countries, including the United States, do 
not track whether imports are destined for fi nal demand or intermedi-
ate uses but instead assume that industries use imports in proportion to 
their overall use of these products in the economy—this is the so-called 
import proportionality assumption. Measures using the import propor-
tionality assumption will differ from measures based on actual input 
use if two conditions occur: 1) industries’ use of imports differs sig-
nifi cantly from that assumed under the import proportionality assump-
tion, and 2) the price movements of imported and domestic intermedi-
ates within commodity classes differ signifi cantly.1 In this study, we 
call these types of biases the bias caused by the import proportionality 
assumption.
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The second type of bias concerns the price gap between domesti-
cally produced inputs and imported inputs. If manufacturers shift sourc-
ing from a high-cost domestic supplier to a low-cost foreign supplier 
and statisticians do not take account of this price gap, statisticians’ esti-
mates of the inputs of these manufacturers will be downwardly biased, 
and estimates of the total factor productivity (TFP) will be upwardly 
biased. This has been referred to as “offshoring bias” in the literature 
(Diewert and Nakamura 2011; Houseman et al. 2011).
Japan presents an ideal case study to examine both the bias caused 
by the import proportionality assumption and the bias caused by off-
shoring. The reason is that every fi ve years, the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communications publishes the Input-Output Tables for 
Japan (I-O tables), in which domestically produced intermediate inputs 
and imported intermediate inputs are treated separately. The Japanese 
government estimates the input structure by conducting a special sur-
vey, implemented by the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry 
(METI), on the sources of each industry’s procurements. Moreover, 
because of Japan’s location, imports of intermediate inputs from China 
and other developing economies in East Asia have increased rapidly 
in recent decades. Against this background, using Japan’s I-O tables 
and price indices for imported and domestic products, one of the major 
aims of this study is to estimate the bias from the import proportional-
ity assumption by examining differences in estimates of import use in 
the I-O tables based on actual data and estimates based on the import 
proportionality assumption. 
In order to estimate offshoring bias, we need—in addition to data on 
import use in the economy and price indices for imported and domestic 
products—data on the price gap between domestically produced inputs 
and imported inputs. In Japan, such data are available from the Sur-
vey on Foreign and Domestic Price Differentials for Industrial Inter-
mediate Input, conducted by METI every year. This survey provides 
information on differentials in customer delivery prices among Japan, 
China, the United States, Germany, South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong 
Kong for about 180 commodities and 40 services. Using these data, 
we estimate the price gap between domestically produced inputs and 
imported inputs by country of origin.
The structure of the article is as follows. In Section Two, “Approach 
to Measuring the Two Types of Biases,” we explain our methodology to 
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estimate the two types of biases using data on Japan. We then explain 
our data in Section Three, “Data Used.” We also detail what data METI 
collects and how it collects these data. In Section Four, “Estimation 
of Bias Caused by the Import Proportionality Assumption,” we report 
our results on bias created by the import proportionality assumption. In 
Section Five, “Estimation of Offshoring Bias,” we report our results on 
the second type of bias. Section Six concludes.
APPROACH TO MEASURING THE TWO TYPES OF BIASES
This section presents the approach we use to measure the two types 
of bias: 1) bias caused by the import proportionality assumption and 2) 
offshoring bias.
We start by explaining our approach to measuring the bias caused 
by the import proportionality assumption. 
In Japan, input-output tables, in which domestically produced inter-
mediate inputs and imported intermediate inputs are treated separately, 
are constructed every fi ve years. Therefore, data on the nominal value 
of imported intermediate inputs from sector i to sector j, Xi,j
M(t), and 
data on the nominal value of domestically produced intermediate inputs 
from sector i to sector j, Xi,j
H(t), are available separately. Here, super-
script M stands for imported intermediate inputs and superscript H stands 
for domestically produced intermediate inputs. In the United States, 
only data on the total value of intermediate inputs from sector i to sec-
tor j, Xi,j
M(t)+Xi,j
H(t), are available to construct input-output tables; the 
extent to which the intermediate inputs used in sector j are imported or 
domestically produced is unknown. 
Let us theoretically examine biases caused by this shortcoming 
of U.S.-type input-output tables based on the import comparability 
assumption. 
Assume that imported intermediate inputs from sector i to sector j 
and domestically produced intermediate inputs from sector i to sector 
j are different products and the cost share of each product reveals its 
marginal contribution to production in sector j. 
In Japan, as in the United States, data on the absolute price levels 
of imported products and domestic products are not available. In both 
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countries, only the price indexes of imported products and domestic 
products are available. Let Pi
M(t) / Pi
M(0) denote the price change of 
imported product i from year 0 to year t and Pi
H(t) / Pi
H(0) denote the 
price change of domestically produced product i from year 0 to year t.2 
For our estimation of the bias, which would be caused  by a lack 
of information on imports, we fi rst prepared nominal and real import 
input-output tables for 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2008 in Japan using 
data on import use in the economy. As we will explain in detail in the 
next section, the main sources of our I-O tables are the 1995-2000-
2005 Linked Input-Output Tables, published by the Statistics Bureau of 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIAC), and the 
2008 Updated Input-Output Tables, published by METI. Both of the 
statistics set 2005 as their benchmark year. 
The key variables we would like to estimate are the real input 
indexes for each sector. For the calculation of these quantity indexes, 
we use 2005 as the base year. That is, we weight input quantity changes 
by the nominal input values of 2005. Using Japan’s I-O tables, which 
incorporate information on the use of imports in the economy, we derive 





















































   

























where the superscript J means that this index is based on noncompeti-
tive import-type I-O tables like Japan’s. T denotes the base year, 2005.3 
In most countries, data on the destination of imports in the econ-
omy are not regularly available, and the ordinary approach is to assume 
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that a sector’s imports of each input, relative to its total demand, are 
the same as the economy-wide imports relative to total demand (as is 
assumed in the I-O tables for the United States)—the so-called import 
proportionality assumption.
That is, an industry’s imports are calculated as follows: let mi(t) 

























H(t) denote the value of imports of product i used 
to satisfy fi nal demand k and the value of domestic output of product i 
used to satisfy fi nal demand k. 
In this shortcut approach, growth of real inputs from sector i to sec-
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Moreover, the real input index for sector j for year t, xj
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where the superscript U means that this index is drawn from U.S.-type 
input-output tables based on the import proportionality assumption.
Equation (7.3) shows that when the price of imports relative to that 




H(t)) from T to 
t for most inputs i, we will underestimate the increase in intermediate 
inputs in sectors where imports of product i relative to the sector’s total 
demand is higher than the economy-wide imports/domestic output ratio 
((Xi,j
M(t) / ( Xi,j
M(t)+ Xi,j
H(t)) > mi(t)) for these inputs. As a result, we will 
overestimate the TFP growth of such sectors. 
This type of bias is caused by the assumption that an industry’s 
imports of each input, relative to its total demand, are the same as the 
economy-wide imports relative to total demand. This bias will be large 
if imports of each input, relative to the total demand for that input, are 
quite different across sectors, and if changes in the relative prices of 
imports and domestic products are large. 
Biases caused by the import proportionality assumption have zero-
sum characteristics. In some sectors, the imports-total demand ratio 
is higher than the economy-wide average, while in others, the ratio is 
lower. Therefore, these biases will tend to cancel each other out when 
we calculate macro-level TFP growth. However, if imports tend to be 
used more as intermediate inputs and domestic output tends to be used 
more for satisfying fi nal demand, we will overestimate TFP growth 
of the macroeconomy when the prices of imports relative to those of 
domestic output decline.
Using Japan’s I-O data from 1995 to 2008, we will analyze how 
the intermediate input index based on Equation (7.1) moves differently 
from the intermediate input index based on Equation (7.3).
Next, let us explain our methodology for measuring offshoring 
bias. The offshoring bias concerns an important caveat regarding our 
real input index xj
J(t), which is defi ned by Equation (7.1) and is based 
on import I-O tables like Japan’s. If quality-adjusted prices of imports i 
and that of domestic output i are different, then our intermediate input 
index defi ned by Equation (7.1) is not appropriate for measuring true 
intermediate input growth. This issue was fi rst pointed out by Diewert 
and Nakamura (2011) and empirically examined by Houseman et al. 
(2011).
If we express the (quality-adjusted) absolute price level of imported 
products by Pi
M(t) and the (quality-adjusted) absolute price level of 
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domestically produced products by Pi
H(t), then the appropriate input 













































where the superscript O means that this index is based on information on 
price gaps between domestically produced inputs and imported inputs 
and is free from offshoring bias.
Assume that imports are cheaper than domestically produced 
inputs and that both prices, Pi
M(t) and Pi
H(t), are constant over time. 
Also assume that fi rms in sector j substitute imports for domestically 
produced inputs by the same amount, and that imports and domesti-
cally produced inputs make the same marginal contribution to produc-
tion. Then the true intermediate input index must remain constant. Input 
index xj
O(t), which is defi ned by Equation (7.4), satisfi es this condi-
tion. But both the input index xj
J(t), which is defi ned by Equation (7.1), 
and the input index xj
U(t), which is defi ned by Equation (7.3), decline. 
When we use xj
J(t) or xj
U(t), we will judge incorrectly that the intermedi-
ate input in sector i has decreased. Thus, we will overestimate the TFP 
growth of sector i.
Using METI’s Survey on Foreign and Domestic Price Differentials 
for Industrial Intermediate Input (METI 1999) and Japan’s I-O data, we 
will evaluate offshoring bias by comparing the intermediate input index 
xj
U(t) defi ned by Equation (7.3) and the intermediate input index xj
O(t) 
defi ned by Equation (7.4).
DATA USED
In this section we explain the data we use for our analysis. For 
information on the nominal use of imports in the Japanese economy 
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in 1995, 2000, and 2005, we use the Input-Output Tables for Japan for 
each of these years, published by the Statistics Bureau of the Minis-
try of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIAC). For these years, 
tables of imports reporting the nominal value of imports used as inputs 
in sector j, Xi,j
M(t), and the nominal value of imports used to satisfy fi nal 
demand k, Fi,k
M(t), for each product i are available. 
In order to construct these tables on imports, METI, which collabo-
rates with MIAC to compile the I-O tables, conducts its survey on the 
use of major imports at the HS nine-digit level.4 Online Appendix Table 
7A.1 provides an outline of the questionnaire form, which has been 
partially fi lled out by the authors with made-up industry names to illus-
trate the conceptual framework of the METI survey.5 About 200 trading 
companies and producer associations are interviewed; the latter, such 
as the association of electronics parts producers and the association 
of automobile parts producers, make up the majority. This means that 
METI mainly asks the Japanese producers of each commodity about the 
destination industries for imports of these commodities, most of which 
are produced by their rivals abroad. (Of course, some Japanese produc-
ers are now multinationals and import from their own affi liates abroad.) 
To extend our analysis to more recent years, we estimate import 
input-output tables for 2008 using the 2008 Updated Input-Output 
Tables and the 2005 Input-Output Tables for Japan. The updated I-O 
Tables do not contain tables on imports, so we therefore estimate tables 
on imports by extrapolating data in import tables for 2005 using import 
data for 2008.
We obtain defl ators for imports and domestic output separately for 
each sector i from the 1995-2000-2005 Linked Input-Output Tables, 
published by the Statistics Bureau of MIAC, and the 2008 Updated
Input-Output Tables. In these I-O tables, the major original sources 
of defl ators for commodities are the Domestic Corporate Goods Price 
Index (DCGPI) and the Import Price Index (IPI), taken from the Corpo-
rate Goods Price Index, published by the Bank of Japan.
Using these various sources, we prepared nominal and real import 
input-output tables for 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2008. The endogenous 
sector table for each year has 514 rows and 401 columns. In our analy-
sis, we set 2005 as our benchmark year for our calculation of the quan-
tity and the price index before and after 2005.
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Moreover, for data on price gaps necessary for our analysis we use 
the Survey on Foreign and Domestic Price Differentials for Industrial 
Intermediate Input (METI 1999). This survey has been conducted every 
year since 1993 and reports differences in the customer delivery price 
for about 150 intermediate goods and 30 services between Japan on the 
one hand and the United States, China, Germany, and the newly indus-
trializing economies (NIEs, consisting of South Korea, Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, and Singapore) on the other. The survey specifi es each com-
modity and service in great detail. In the case of commodities, the sur-
vey in principle follows the commodity specifi cation of the Corporate 
Goods Price Index.
As we will report in detail in Section Five, “Estimation of Offshor-
ing Bias,” unit prices in the developing economies included in the survey 
(i.e., China and the NIEs) for many products tend to be much lower than 
unit prices in the developed economies (i.e., Japan, the United States, 
and Germany). This implies that it would be inappropriate to assume, 
as is done in Equation (7.4), that the unit prices of Japanese imports are 
identical regardless of the country of origin. We therefore distinguish 
between imports from developed and from developing economies.
The number of goods and services covered by the survey differs 
across countries and across years. Data are relatively abundant for U.S.-
Japan and China-Japan price differences from 2000, and we therefore 
use data for the two pairs for 2000 and 2008.6  
We grouped Japan’s trade partners into two groups: 1) developed 
economies, consisting of the United States and countries that were 
members of the European Union in 2000, and 2) developing economies, 
consisting of China and the rest of the world. We assume that price dif-
ferentials between Japan and the developed economies are the same as 
the U.S.-Japan price differentials, and that price differentials between 
Japan and the developing economies are the same as the China-Japan 
price differentials.
A potential problem is that customer delivery prices in the United 
States and China reported in METI’s survey may include prices of 
goods imported into the United States and China, but what we would 
like to know is the price gaps between domestically produced goods 
and imported goods from China and the United States in Japan. How-
ever, because we have no way of knowing whether the customer deliv-
ery prices in the United States and China reported in the METI survey 
up15shmg10ch7.indd   227 2/17/2015   11:36:29 AM
228   Fukao and Arai
include imported goods, we assume that the price gaps reported in the 
survey are good indicators of the price gaps between domestically pro-
duced goods and imported goods in Japan.
Another, related issue is that in Japan’s I-O tables, the value of 
domestic products is given on a producer price basis, while the value 
of imported products is on a CIF (cost, insurance, and freight) basis. 
On the other hand, METI’s survey reports price gaps between customer 
delivery prices in Japan and customer delivery prices in other countries. 
Because of trade costs, it is likely that the ratio of the price of imported 
products on a CIF basis over the price of domestic products will tend to 
be higher than the ratio of customer delivery prices in other countries 
over customer delivery prices in Japan. In order to adjust for this factor, 
we assume for each commodity that the ratio of the price of imported 
products on a CIF basis over the price of domestic products is 10 per-
cent higher than the ratio of customer delivery prices in other countries 
over customer delivery prices in Japan.
In our analysis of offshoring bias, we use 2000 as the base year and 
set the producer prices of domestic product i in year 2000, Pi
H(2000), 
equal to one for all i. We derive the CIF price of product i in year 2000 
imported from developed economies, Pi
D(2000), and the CIF price of 
product i in year 2000 imported from developing economies, Pi
L(2000), 



















L(2000) respectively denote the 
customer delivery price of product i in year 2000 in Japan, the United 
States, and China, which we take from the Survey on Foreign and 
Domestic Price Differentials for Industrial Intermediate Input (METI 
1999).
As for the CIF prices of product i in Year 2008 imported from devel-
oped and developing economies (both developed and developing mea-
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sured in terms of the producer price of domestic product i in Year 2000 
in Japan), one way to estimate this is to use the customer delivery price 
in Year 2008 in Japan, the United States, and China and sectoral defl a-
tors in the I-O tables. That is, we can derive the CIF price of product i in 
Year 2008 imported from developed economies, Pi
D(2008), and the CIF 
price of product i in Year 2008 imported from developing economies, 
Pi
L(2008), for each i, as well as the producer price of domestic product i 
in year 2008, Pi








































L(2008) denote the customer deliv-
ery price of product i in Year 2008 in Japan, the United States, and 
China, respectively. We obtain Pi
H(2008) / Pi
H(2000) from the sectoral 
defl ators in the 1995-2000-2005 Linked Input-Output Tables and the 
2008 Updated Input-Output Tables.
We should note that there is another important source of import 
price change in addition to the combined data of the Survey on For-
eign and Domestic Price Differentials for Industrial Intermediate Input 
(METI 1999) and the sectoral defl ators in the 1995-2000-2005 Linked 
Input-Output Tables and the 2008 Updated Input-Output Tables—
namely, the import defl ators in the I-O tables. The import defl ators in 
the I-O tables are mainly based on the Bank of Japan–published Cor-
porate Goods Price Index, which covers many more commodities and 
countries of origin than METI’s survey. The import defl ators in the I-O 
tables therefore likely are more reliable than our estimates using Equa-
tions (7.7), (7.8), and (7.9), but the I-O tables do not contain data on 
import prices by country of origin or on absolute price gaps. Taking 
these advantages and disadvantages of the import defl ator in the I-O 
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tables into account, we use these defl ators as a kind of a control total, as 
we shall explain below. 
The CIF price of product i in year 2008 imported from developed 
economies, Pi
D(2008), and the CIF price of product i in year 2008 
imported from developing economies, Pi
L(2008), are expected to satisfy 


























M(t) denotes Japan’s import price of product i from the rest of 
the world in year t, and mi
D(t) denotes the percentage of Japan’s imports 
of product i from developed economies in Japan’s total imports in 2008. 
We obtain these data from the Trade Statistics of Japan, published by 
the Ministry of Finance.
Because of the differences in data sources and other factors (such 
as the fact that we use price difference data only for the U.S.-Japan 
and China-Japan pairs, whereas the import defl ators in the I-O tables 
cover all of Japan’s imports from the world), Pi
D(2008) and Pi
L(2008), 
derived from Equations (7.8) and (7.9), do not necessarily satisfy Equa-
tion (7.10). To make Pi
D(2008) and Pi
L(2008) consistent with Equation 
(7.10), we add an adjustment term γ on the right-hand side of Equations 
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It can be easily confi rmed that Pi
D(2008) and Pi
L(2008), defi ned by 
Equations (7.11) and (7.12), satisfy Equation (7.10).
Our input index for sector j for year t, which is based on informa-
tion on price gaps between domestically produced inputs and imported 



































































for t = 2000, 2008, and T = 2000. This is a modifi ed version of Equation 
(7.4). 
Two additional caveats with regard to our data should be pointed 
out. First, METI’s survey on price differentials does not cover food 
processing and agricultural, fi shery, and forestry output, while the cov-
erage of service output is very limited. Therefore, we calculate price 
gaps only for the output of the mining and manufacturing sectors other 
than processed food, and we assume that there are no price differentials 
in the case of agricultural, forestry, and fi shery products; food process-
ing; and services. Moreover, because of this limitation in the data, we 
excluded the food processing sector from our analysis of the offshoring 
bias. 
Second, even in the case of nonfood commodities, the number of 
commodities reported in the survey (about 180) is not suffi cient for 
the estimation of price gaps for our disaggregated three-digit-level 
I-O tables in which we have 285 rows, consisting of the mining sec-
tor and of manufacturing sectors other than processed food. Therefore, 
for industries in the I-O tables that we could not match at the three-
digit level, we assumed that the price gap was the same as at the more 
aggregated two-digit industry level. Moreover, when the METI survey 
provides price gap data on multiple commodities that correspond to one 
of the 285 industry rows, we calculate the industry average price gap 
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for that industry by employing the weights used in the METI survey. 
The original source of the weights is the Corporate Goods Price Index.
ESTIMATION OF BIAS CAUSED BY THE IMPORT
PROPORTIONALITY ASSUMPTION
Using our data, we analyze how the prices of imported inputs rela-
tive to domestically produced inputs changed between 1995 and 2005, 
as well as how much the share of imported inputs in total inputs differs 
across sectors and how this share changed between 1995 and 2005. In 
addition, we estimate the bias from the import proportionality assump-
tion by comparing the intermediate input index based on information 
from the tables on imports. We estimate the index based on the assump-
tion that an industry’s imports of each input, relative to its total demand, 
are the same as the economy-wide imports relative to total demand (as 
is assumed in the I-O tables for the United States).
As we explained in Section Two, “Approach to Measuring the Two 
Types of Biases,” the bias caused by the assumption that an industry’s 
imports of each input, relative to its total demand, are the same as the 
economy-wide imports, relative to total demand, will be large if changes 
in the relative prices of imports and domestic products are large and if 
imports of each input, relative to the total demand for that input, are 
quite different across sectors. 
Figure 7.1 shows how the ratio of the average price index of 
imported inputs over the average price index of domestically produced 
inputs has changed over time. As can be seen, the ratio declined by 40 
percent in the period 1995–2008. This decline was not caused by yen 
appreciation, since, as Figure 7.1 also shows, the value of the yen as 
measured by the real effective exchange rate fell by more than 50 per-
cent during the same period. Rather, a likely reason for the decline in 
relative import prices is the increase in Japan’s imports of low-priced 
products from Asian countries and the decline of output price in coun-
tries of origin.7 
Figure 7.2 shows the regional composition of Japan’s imports of 
manufactured products for 2000, 2005, and 2008. Similarly, Figure 7.3 
shows the regional composition of Japan’s imports of machinery for 
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2000, 2005, and 2008. The fi gures show that the share of imports from 
China and other Asian countries in Japan’s total manufacturing and 
machinery imports increased rapidly in the 2000s.
Next, Online Appendix Table 7A.2 provides a list of commodities 
for which the ratio of the price of imports over the price of domestic 
Figure 7.1  Average Price of Imported Inputs over Average Price of 
Domestically Produced Inputs (1995 = 1) and Japan’s Real 
Effective Exchange Rate (yen/foreign currency): 1995–2008
NOTE: “BIS” stands for Bank for International Settlements.
SOURCE: 1995-2000-2005 Linked Input-Output Tables, published by the Statistics 
Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIAC); 2008 
Updated Input-Output Tables, published by the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and 



















Average price of imported inputs/average 
price of domestically produced inputs  
(1995=1)
Japan's real effective exchange rate 
(Yen/Foreign currency, BIS data, 1995 = 1)
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Figure 7.2  Regional Composition of Japan’s Imports of Manufactured 
Products: 2000, 2005, and 2008
2000 2005 2008 
Rest of the world 
United States 
Other Asia 
China and Hong Kong 

















Figure 7.3  Regional Composition of Japan’s Imports of Machinery: 
2000, 2005, and 2008
2000 2005 2008 
Rest of the world 
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China and Hong Kong 
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products declined by more than 25 percent from 1995 to 2008. The 
table confi rms that the import price–domestic price ratio of many com-
modities, including important parts and components, sharply declined 
during the period. For instance, in the case of integrated circuits and 
semiconductor devices, the relative price declined by 33 percent and 28 
percent, respectively.
The next issue we examine is how much the share of imported 
inputs in total inputs differs across sectors, and how this share has 
changed over time. We do so by two illustrations, Figures 7.4 and 7.5, 
that use the examples of integrated circuits and semiconductor devices, 
which are important inputs in manufactured products. 
Starting with integrated circuits, the nominal value of total interme-
diate inputs increased from 3.0 trillion yen in 1995 to 3.6 trillion yen in 
2005.8 While this increase in the nominal value is not particularly large, 
intermediate input in real terms in fact increased threefold. The share of 
the total nominal input of imports in total nominal input increased from 
34 percent to 58 percent. The increase in the share of the total nominal 
input of imports was even more pronounced in the case of semiconduc-
tor devices, where it jumped from 18 percent to 61 percent. 
However, as can be seen in Figures 7.4 and 7.5, the share of imports 
in total demand differs considerably across sectors. In the case of both 
fi gures, the import ratio tends to be high in electrical machinery sectors 
but relatively low in other sectors such as automobiles and precision 
machinery. This means that we will underestimate the growth of these 
electronics parts inputs in electrical machinery sectors and overestimate 
it in other machinery sectors if we assume that an industry’s imports of 
each input, relative to its total demand, are the same as the economy-
wide imports relative to total demand.





I(1995)), for all of the 202 manufacturing sectors, 
other than processing food, and all of the six mining sectors, using our 
data. Table 7.1 shows the 25 sectors in which the underestimation of 
intermediate input growth is largest among these 208 mining and man-
ufacturing sectors.9 By multiplying this value with two values—that 
is, with −1 and with the average of the nominal intermediate input–
nominal gross output ratio of a particular sector for 1995 and 2008, we 
also calculate the extent of the overestimation of TFP growth for the 
period 1995–2008. 
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Figure 7.4  Share of Imported Inputs in Total Inputs: Integrated 
Circuits, 1995–2005
SOURCE: 1995 and 2005 Input-Output Tables, published by the Statistics Bureau of 
MIAC.
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Figure 7.5  Share of Imported Inputs in Total Inputs: Semiconductor 
Devices, 1995–2005
SOURCE: 1995 and 2005 Input-Output Tables, published by the Statistics Bureau of 
MIAC.
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Table 7.1  Underestimation of Intermediate Input Growth as a Result 












of 1995 and 
2008)
Overestima-
tion of TFP 




Sector A B A × B
Animal oils and fats −14.04 0.715 10.04
Ordnance −12.62 0.619 7.81
Aircrafts −9.85 0.538 5.29
Liquid crystal elements −8.13 0.727 5.91
Methane derivatives −6.90 0.742 5.12
Organic fertilizers, n.e.c. −4.49 0.657 2.95
Video recording and playback 
equipment
−4.25 0.722 3.07
Thermo-setting resins −4.13 0.733 3.03
Salt −4.13 0.546 2.25
Bicycles −3.73 0.720 2.68
Turbines −3.38 0.643 2.17
Glass fi ber and glass fi ber 
products, n.e.c.
−3.20 0.604 1.93
Integrated circuits −2.62 0.650 1.70
Processed meat products −2.62 0.710 1.86
“Tatami” (straw matting) and 
straw products
−2.47 0.703 1.74
Wooden chips −2.39 0.733 1.75
Other resins −2.34 0.749 1.75
Other glass products −1.94 0.537 1.04
Nonferrous metal castings and 
forgings
−1.85 0.703 1.30
Dextrose, syrup, and isomerized 
sugar
−1.72 0.820 1.41
High function resins −1.49 0.778 1.16
Electronic computing equipment 
(except personal computers)
−1.45 0.716 1.04
Optical fi ber cables −1.28 0.740 0.95
Applied electronic equipment −1.22 0.716 0.88
Watches and clocks −1.21 0.630 0.76
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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In the top 14 sectors in which the underestimation of intermediate 
input growth caused by the import proportionality assumption is larg-
est (namely, animal oils and fats, ordnance, aircraft, liquid crystal ele-
ments, methane derivatives, organic fertilizers not elsewhere classifi ed, 
video recording and playback equipment, thermo-setting resins, salt, 
bicycles, turbines, glass fi ber and glass fi ber products not elsewhere 
classifi ed, integrated circuits, and processed meat products), the nega-
tive bias of intermediate input growth caused by the import proportion-
ality assumption is more than 2.6 percent, and the positive bias of TFP 
growth is more than 1.7 percent. These sectors include important high-
tech machinery sectors, such as aircraft and integrated circuits. 
Next, Table 7.2 shows the 27 sectors in which the overestimation of 
intermediate input growth is largest among all the manufacturing sec-
tors. These include six sectors—cellular phones, radio and television 
sets, coal products, other nonferrous metal products, repair of aircraft, 
and other photographic and optical instruments—where the positive 
bias of intermediate input growth is at least 3.25 percent, and the nega-
tive bias of TFP growth is more than 1.9 percent. 
ESTIMATION OF OFFSHORING BIAS
Using our data, we estimate offshoring bias by comparing the real 
input index based on information on the price gaps between domesti-
cally produced and imported intermediate inputs. That is, we estimate 
Equation (7.13) in Section Three (“Data Used”), which is a modifi ed 
version of Equation (7.4) in Section Two (“Approach to Measuring the 
Two Types of Biases”). We also estimate the real input index, based on 
the assumption that an industry’s imports of each input, relative to the 
total demand for that input, are the same as the economy-wide imports 
relative to total demand (as is assumed in the I-O tables for the United 
States)—i.e., Equation (7.3) in Section Two. For the estimation, we use 
the year 2000 as our base year and calculate how the two types of inter-
mediate input indexes for each sector changed from 2000 to 2008. In 
addition, we analyze how much of a price gap there exists between 
domestically produced intermediate inputs, inputs imported from devel-
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of 1995 and 
2008)
Underestima-
tion of TFP 




Sector A B A × B
Cellular phones 5.49 0.782 −4.30
Radio and television sets 5.47 0.780 −4.27
Coal products 4.04 0.825 −3.33
Other nonferrous metal products 3.70 0.715 −2.64
Repair of aircraft 3.49 0.656 −2.29
Other photographic and optical 
instruments
3.25 0.592 −1.92
Confectionery 3.04 0.580 −1.76
Electric audio equipment 2.96 0.742 −2.20
Leather and fur skins 2.87 0.692 −1.98
Bottled or canned vegetables and fruits 2.69 0.770 −2.07
Chemical fertilizer 2.54 0.685 −1.74
Other electrical devices and parts 2.41 0.630 −1.52
Retort foods 2.40 0.704 −1.69
Dishes, sushi, and lunch boxes 2.16 0.697 −1.50
Synthetic dyes 2.12 0.649 −1.38
Other metal products 1.88 0.463 −0.87
Batteries 1.80 0.733 −1.32
Other electronic components 1.78 0.690 −1.23
Medicaments 1.67 0.608 −1.01
Dairy farm products 1.49 0.779 −1.16
Steel pipes and tubes 1.42 0.759 −1.08
Other industrial organic chemicals 1.26 0.672 −0.84
Soap, synthetic detergents, and surface 
active agents
1.21 0.715 −0.86
Synthetic fi bers 1.21 0.633 −0.77
Preserved agricultural foodstuffs (other 
than bottled or canned)
1.21 0.631 −0.76
Nuclear fuels 1.21 0.541 −0.65
Inorganic pigment 1.18 0.687 −0.81
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
Table 7.2  Overestimation of Intermediate Input Growth as a Result 
of the Import Proportionality Assumption: Top 27 Sectors, 
1995–2008
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oped economies, and inputs imported from developing economies, as 
well as how these price gaps changed from 2000 to 2008. 
As Diewert and Nakamura (2011) and Houseman et al. (2011) 
explain, offshoring bias tends to be greater when there are large price 
gaps between domestically produced intermediate inputs and imported 
inputs and when fi rms substitute imports for domestically produced 
inputs to a substantial extent. 
Online Appendix Figures 7A.1 and 7A.2 show our results for esti-
mating the price gaps between domestically produced intermediate 
inputs, inputs imported from developed economies, and inputs imported 
from developing economies for 2000 and 2008, respectively. For the 
calculation, we use Equations (7.5), (7.6), (7.9), (7.11), and (7.12). In 
the two fi gures, the price levels of domestically produced products are 
set to 1 for both 2000 and 2008. Moreover, for the fi gures, we aggregate 
the estimated price gaps for the 285 sectors into 53 sectors. As explained 
in Section Three, titled “Data Used,” our estimation of the price gaps 
between developed economies and Japan is based on U.S.-Japan price 
differentials, and our estimation of the price gaps between developing 
economies and Japan is based on China-Japan price differentials.
The two fi gures show that in the case of price gaps between domes-
tically produced inputs and inputs imported from developed econo-
mies, domestically produced inputs are not always more expensive than 
imported inputs. On the contrary, in many sectors, including most of the 
machinery sectors, the price level of domestically produced inputs was 
lower than the price level of inputs imported from developed econo-
mies, both in 2000 and in 2008.
In the case of price gaps between domestically produced inputs 
and inputs imported from developing economies, imported inputs are 
cheaper than domestically produced inputs in most of the sectors. More-
over, in both 2000 and 2008, the price gap is considerable, not only in 
the case of most of the light-industry products (such as apparel and 
other textile products, timber and wooden products, and fur skins and 
miscellaneous leather products), but also in the case of most machinery 
products. 
In comparing the price gaps between domestically produced inputs 
and inputs imported from developing economies in 2000 and 2008, the 
gaps do not seem to have widened in most sectors, although there are 
some exceptions such as electronic computing equipment and acces-
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sories as well as semiconductor devices and integrated circuits. In fact, 
price gaps narrowed slightly in some sectors, probably because of rapid 
increases in wages in China (as well as appreciation of the Chinese 
exchange rates). 
These results suggest that during this period there was no large off-
shoring bias caused by a sharp decline in the prices of inputs imported 
from developing economies, except in the case of the electrical machin-
ery industry. However, even though prices of imported inputs generally 
may not have fallen, it is still possible that there was substantial offshor-
ing bias as a result of the rapid increase of imported inputs at prevailing 
price gaps. As seen in Figures 7.2 and 7.3, the share of imports of man-
ufactured products from China, Hong Kong, and other Asian econo-
mies in Japan’s total imports increased considerably between 2000 and 
2008. Moreover, Figure 7.6 shows that Japan’s imports of machinery 
increased not only in the case of fi nal goods but also in the case of many 
types of parts and components.
To examine whether the rapid rise in imported inputs from devel-
oping countries gave rise to offshoring bias, we calculate the extent of 





O(2000)), using our data. By multiplying this value 
with −1 and with the average value of the nominal intermediate input–
nominal gross output ratio of a particular sector for 2000 and 2008, we 
also calculate the extent of the overestimation of TFP growth for the 
period 2000–2008.
Table 7.3 shows the 27 sectors in which the underestimation of 
intermediate input growth is largest among all of the 208 mining and 
manufacturing sectors other than food processing. Probably refl ecting 
the fact that Japan’s imports of cheap electrical parts and components 
from developing economies have increased substantially, the 27 sec-
tors include many electrical machinery sectors such as liquid crystal 
elements, personal computers, electronic computing equipment (except 
personal computers), and electric measuring instruments. Among the 
27 sectors, about half produce machinery.
In many sectors, especially in machinery sectors, offshoring bias 
is of a substantial size that cannot be ignored. For example, Table 7.3 
shows that the TFP growth rate in liquid crystal elements and in per-
sonal computers is overestimated by 5.92 percent and 5.34 percent, 
up15shmg10ch7.indd   242 2/17/2015   11:36:31 AM
Biases to Manufacturing Statistics from Offshoring   243
Table 7.3  Underestimation of Intermediate Input Growth and Total 










value of 2000 
and 2008)
Overestimation 
of TFP growth 
on a gross 
output basis (%, 
2000–2008)
Sector A B A×B
Tatami (straw matting) and straw 
products
−15.47 0.738 11.41
Nuclear fuels −13.14 0.551 7.24
Toys and games −9.92 0.700 6.95
Pumps and compressors −8.90 0.644 5.73
Rayon and acetate −8.84 0.678 6.00
Other nonmetallic ores −8.55 0.578 4.94
Liquid crystal element −8.21 0.721 5.92
Metallic ores −7.78 0.465 3.62
Salt −7.10 0.535 3.80
Repair of aircraft −6.87 0.674 4.63
Pulp −6.87 0.858 5.90
Food processing machinery and 
equipment
−6.85 0.582 3.98
Sheet glass and safety glass −6.72 0.582 3.91
Personal computers −6.56 0.814 5.34
Paperboard −6.36 0.722 4.59
Other nonferrous metal products −6.29 0.706 4.44
Electronic computing equipment 
(except personal computers)
−6.25 0.748 4.68
Electric measuring instruments −6.24 0.660 4.12
Other offi ce machines −6.13 0.737 4.52
Coal mining, crude petroleum, 
and natural gas
−5.84 0.428 2.50
Boilers −5.66 0.575 3.25
Textile machinery −5.46 0.594 3.24
Machinists’ precision tools −5.44 0.540 2.93
Bearings −5.40 0.596 3.22
Other structural clay products −4.87 0.537 2.62
Chemical machinery −4.77 0.574 2.74
Other wooden products −4.75 0.547 2.60
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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respectively (the annual rate in log value is 0.74 percent and 0.67 per-
cent, respectively). 
We should note that the biases shown in Table 7.3 contain both 
biases caused by the import proportionality assumption and biases 
caused by gaps in the absolute price levels between imported prod-
ucts and domestically produced products. It is probably for this reason 
that many electrical machinery sectors such as liquid crystal elements, 
personal computers, electronic computing equipment (except personal 
computers), and electric measuring instruments appear in both Tables 
7.1 and 7.3. 
Comparing Tables 7.1 and 7.3, we also fi nd that the biases in Table 
7.3 tend to be much larger than those in Table 7.1, although the period 
covered by Table 7.3 is fi ve years shorter than the period covered by 
Table 7.1. The minimum value of the bias in TFP growth in Table 7.3 is 
3.04 percent (for leather and fur skins), which is much larger than the 
Figure 7.6  Japan’s Imports of Machinery from Developing Economies: 
2000 and 2008 (billions of yen)
SOURCE: Trade Statistics of Japan, published by the Ministry of Finance.
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minimum value of the bias in TFP growth in Table 7.1, 0.70 percent 
(for cameras). It seems that biases caused by gaps in the absolute price 
levels between imported products and domestically produced products 
are a more serious problem than biases caused by the import propor-
tionality assumptions.
In the case of the overestimation of intermediate input growth, such 
overestimation occurred in only 29 out of the 208 mining and manufac-
turing sectors other than food processing. In other words, in 179 sectors, 
intermediate inputs were underestimated. Among the 29 overestimated 
sectors, only fi ve sectors produce machinery. We also fi nd that in many 
sectors the magnitude (absolute value) of the underestimation of TFP 
growth caused by offshoring bias is smaller than the magnitude (abso-
lute value) of the overestimation of TFP growth caused by offshoring 
bias, which is reported in Online Appendix Table 7A.3. 
As pointed out in Section Two, biases caused by the import propor-
tionality assumption have zero-sum characteristics. In some sectors, the 
imports–total demand ratio is higher than the economy-wide average, 
while in others, the ratio is lower. Therefore, these biases will tend to 
cancel each other out when we calculate macro-level TFP growth. 
However, offshoring biases do not have such zero-sum characteris-
tics. If a majority of sectors shift their sourcing from high-cost domes-
tic suppliers to low-cost foreign suppliers, then the TFP growth of all 
these sectors will be overestimated, and the TFP growth of the economy 
as a whole will also be overestimated. Table 7.3 and Online Appendix 
Table 7A.3 show that TFP growth was overestimated in 179 out of the 
208 mining and manufacturing sectors during the period 2000–2008. 
It therefore seems likely that the TFP growth of Japan’s economy as a 
whole during this period may also have been overestimated. 
CONCLUSION
Using import tables and other data from Japan’s input-output tables 
for 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2008, we estimated how much and in what 
direction the intermediate input index and TFP growth will be biased 
if we assume that an industry’s imports of each input, relative to the 
total demand for the input, are the same as the economy-wide imports 
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relative to total demand. We also examined offshoring bias, which con-
cerns the price gap between domestically produced inputs and imported 
inputs. For this analysis, we used the Survey on Foreign and Domestic 
Price Differentials for Industrial Intermediate Input (METI 1999) in 
addition to I-O tables.
Our main fi ndings are listed in the following 10 points:
1) Our theoretical analysis shows that the bias caused by the 
import proportionality assumption will be large if imports of 
each input, relative to the total demand for it, are quite different 
across sectors and changes in the relative prices of imports and 
domestic products are large.
2) Japan experienced a 40 percent decline in the ratio of the aver-
age price of imported inputs over the average price of domesti-
cally produced inputs in the period 1995–2008. This decline 
was not caused by yen appreciation, since the value of the yen 
as measured by the real effective exchange rate in fact fell by 
more than 50 percent during the same period. Rather, a likely 
reason for the decline in relative import prices is the increase in 
Japan’s imports of low-priced products from Asian countries.
3) The import price–domestic price ratio of many commodities, 
including important parts and components, declined sharply 
during the period 1995–2008. 
4) We examined how the share of imported inputs in total inputs 
differs across sectors, focusing on the cases of integrated cir-
cuits and semiconductor devices. We found that for both types 
of input, the import ratio tends to be high in the electrical 
machinery sectors. Moreover, the ratio is relatively low in other 
sectors such as automobiles and precision machinery. 
5) We found that the bias caused by the import proportionality 
assumption is quite large in some sectors. For example, in ani-
mal oils and fats, ordnance, aircraft, liquid crystal elements, 
methane derivatives, organic fertilizers not elsewhere classi-
fi ed, video recording and playback equipment, thermo-setting 
resins, salt, bicycles, turbines, glass fi ber and glass fi ber prod-
ucts not elsewhere classifi ed, integrated circuits, and processed 
meat products, the negative bias of intermediate input growth 
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caused by the import proportionality assumption is more than 
2.6 percent, and the positive offshoring bias of TFP growth is 
more than 1.7 percent. 
6) On the other hand, in cellular phones, radio and television sets, 
coal products, other nonferrous metal products, repair of air-
craft, and photographic and optical instruments, the positive 
offshoring bias of intermediate input growth is more than 3.2 
percent, and the negative offshoring bias of TFP growth is more 
than 1.9 percent.
7) Next, we estimated offshoring biases caused by the price gap 
between domestically produced inputs and imported inputs and 
the substitution of intermediate inputs from expensive domes-
tic products to cheap foreign products. In the case of price gaps 
between domestically produced inputs and inputs imported 
from developing economies, imported inputs are cheaper than 
domestically produced inputs in most sectors. Moreover, in 
both 2000 and 2008, the price gap was relatively large not only 
in the case of most light industry products, such as apparel and 
other textile products, timber and wooden products, and fur 
skins and miscellaneous leather products, but also in the case 
of most machinery products.
8) In the 2000s, Japan’s imports of machinery from developing 
economies increased not only in the case of fi nal goods but also 
in the case of many types of parts and components. As a result 
of the rapid increase of imported inputs at prevailing price gaps, 
in many sectors, especially in machinery sectors, a substantial 
offshoring bias arose that cannot be ignored. For example, the 
TFP growth rates for the liquid crystal elements and personal 
computers sectors are overestimated by 5.92 percent and 5.34 
percent, respectively. (The annual rates in log value were 0.74 
percent and 0.67 percent.)
9) Refl ecting the fact that Japan’s imports of cheap electrical parts 
and components from developing economies increased sub-
stantially, the 50 sectors in which the underestimation of inter-
mediate input growth is largest include many electrical machin-
ery sectors such as liquid crystal elements, personal computers, 
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electronic computing equipment (except personal computers), 
and electric measuring instruments.
10) Biases caused by the import proportionality assumption have 
zero-sum characteristics. In some sectors, the imports-total 
demand ratio is higher than the economy-wide average, while 
in others, the ratio is lower. Therefore, these biases will tend 
to cancel each other out when we calculate macro-level TFP 
growth. In contrast, offshoring biases do not have such zero-
sum characteristics. If most sectors shifted their sourcing from 
high-cost domestic suppliers to low-cost foreign suppliers, then 
the TFP growth of these sectors would be overestimated. In this 
case, the TFP growth of the economy as a whole would also 
be overestimated. We found that during the period 2000–2008 
TFP growth was overestimated as a result of offshoring bias in 
179 out of the 208 mining and manufacturing sectors we exam-
ined. Consequently, Japan’s TFP growth at macro-level during 
this period may also be overestimated.
One of the key fi ndings is that there are relatively large biases due to 
offshoring in a substantial number of manufacturing sectors, including 
important machinery sectors. This means that the issue of biases from 
offshoring should be taken into account in future productivity analy-
ses at the sectoral and fi rm levels. Moreover, since offshoring activities 
are likely to continue increasing, data collection by statistical offi ces 
to grapple with such offshoring biases will be of growing importance.
Notes
This research was conducted as part of the Research Institute of Economy, Trade, and 
Industry’s (RIETI’s) East Asian Industrial Productivity Project. We would also like to 
express our thanks for fi nancial support from the Global Centers of Excellence program 
Research Unit for Statistical and Empirical Analysis in Social Sciences (G-COE Hi-
Stat), Hitotsubashi University. 
1. A good discussion of these types of biases is provided in the next chapter, Chapter 8.
2. For ease of presentation, it is assumed here that each sector produces one product, 
so subscript i is used to refer to both sectors and products.
3. Our quantity indexes are based on the Laspeyres formula for years after the base 
year T and on the Paasche formula for years before T.
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4. In 2013, this survey became one of Japan’s General Statistics and is now called the 
Survey on Input-Output Structure (Survey on Sale Destination of Import Goods). 
5. The online appendix, containing Appendix Tables 7A.1, 7A.2, and 7A.3 
and Appendix Figures 7A.1 and 7A.2, can be found at http://www.upjohn
.org/MEG/Ch7appendix.pdf. 
6. In the case of the 2000 survey, the survey investigates absolute price levels in each 
country’s currency during the period September–November 2000 and converts 
these prices into prices in Japanese yen using average market exchange rates dur-
ing the survey period. The exchange rates were 108.00 yen to the U.S. dollar and 
13.05 yen to the Chinese yuan. In the case of the 2008 survey, the survey period 
was July–September 2008, and the exchange rates were 107.60 yen to the U.S. 
dollar and 15.74 yen to the Chinese yuan.
7. As already explained, we obtain defl ators for imports and domestic output sepa-
rately for each sector i from the 1995-2000-2005 Linked Input-Output Tables pub-
lished by the Statistics Bureau, MIAC, and the 2008 Updated Input-Output Tables. 
In these I-O tables, the major original sources for defl ators for commodities are the 
Domestic Corporate Goods Price Index (DCGPI) and the Import Price Index (IPI), 
both taken from the Corporate Goods Price Index, published by the Bank of Japan. 
When the Bank of Japan compiles the IPI, it specifi es each commodity in great 
detail and tracks price changes of the same commodity from the same country of 
origin. Therefore, a shift of imports from high-price countries to low-price coun-
tries will not affect the IPI and the defl ators of the I-O tables. However, in the case 
of some imported raw materials and manufactured products, for which IPI data are 
not available, the I-O tables use the unit price of imports as defl ators. In the case of 
these products, a shift of imports from high-price countries to low-price countries 
will reduce the defl ators in the I-O tables. Therefore, the decline in relative import 
prices in Figure 7.1 refl ects not only the decline of output prices in countries of 
origin but also the increase in Japan’s imports of low-priced products from Asian 
countries. We should also note that in the case of these products, for which unit 
prices from the trade statistics are used as import defl ators, Equation (7.10) does 
not strictly hold. When the unit prices of imports decline because of a shift from 
high-cost exporters to low-cost exporters, there is a risk that Equations (7.11) and 
(7.12) will overestimate the price decline in exporting countries.
8. The reason that we focus on the period up to 2005 and not up to 2008 here is that 
we had to estimate the table on imports for 2008; we therefore think that the table 
on imports for 2005 is more reliable.
9. The reason that we are focusing only on 208 and not 285 industries is as follows: 
As explained in Section Three, titled “Data Used,” the endogenous table we use 
is not symmetric. The table for each year has 514 rows and 401 columns. Out of 
the 514 rows, 285 are for mining and manufacturing sectors other than food pro-
cessing. We prepared our special data on prices and imported intermediate inputs 
by country of origin and other categories for these 285 row sectors. Out of the 
401 columns, 208 are for mining and the manufacturing sectors other than food 
processing. We calculated biases of intermediate inputs and TFP growth for these 
208 column sectors.
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